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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 MBFR VIENNA 0480

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS DECEMBER 3, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0476

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION WITH
EASTERN REPS ON DECEMBER 3, 1974. PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH 5
CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

6. BELGIAN REP AS HOST WELCOMED THE PARTICIPANTS. DRAWING ON TALKING
POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, HE SAID THAT AT THE LAST
INFORMAL SESSION, THE ALLIED REPS HAD MADE AN
IMPORTNAT NEW PROPOSAL. IT PROVIDED A WORKABLE
WAY OF DEALING WITH AIR MANPOWER IN THESE NEGO-
TIATIONS. IT MET THE CONCERNS THE EAST FREQUENTLY
HAD EXPRESSED THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO
INCREASE THE SIZE OF THEIR AIR FORCES IF ONLY

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GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED AS THE WEST HAD PROPOSED.

7. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT, IN THE WEST'S VIEW, THE MAIN PROBLEM THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD DEAL WITH WAS THE DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES. ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF THESE DISPARITIES AND MADE CLEAR THAT, TO FULFILL THE AGREED GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, REDUCTION AGREEMENTS MUST DEAL WITH THESE DISPARITIES BY REDUCING OR ELIMINATING THEM. REDUCTION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER COULD NOT DO THIS. MOREOVER, AS WESTERN REPS HAD STATED, THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS ON BOTH SIDES WERE NEARLY EQUAL, THOUGHT WITH A SLIGHT ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST. NONETHELESS, IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TO A REASONABLE EXTENT THE EAST'S INTEREST IN COVERAGE OF AIR FORCES.

8. BELGIAN REP CONTINUED THAT, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT, THE WEST HAD NOW TAKEN THE MAJOR NEW STEP OF TELLING THE EAST THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE ALLIES WERE READY TO COVER ALL UNIFORMED ACTIVE-DUTY PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WITH THE AGREED EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY. SPECIFICALLY, WESTERN REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST IN THE LAST SESSION THAT THE ALLIES WERE READY TO CONSIDER A MUTUAL NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES. THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH A COMMITMENT IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT. THOUGHT THE WEST WAS NOT PREPARED TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER, THE ALLIES COULD CONSIDER OTHER APPROPRIATE WAYS OF COVERING AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH A SECOND PHASE. WESTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THIS PROPOSAL PROVIDED A WORKABLE WAY OF DEALING WITH THE CONCERNS THE EAST HAD EXPRESSED REGARDING AIR FORCES. AS THE ALLIED REPS HAD STATED ON

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PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THEY WERE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE FIGURES WITH THE EAST FOR THE AIR MANPOWER TOTALS ON BOTH SIDES, JUST AS THEY WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS EASTERN CRITICISMS OF THE WEST'S GROUND MANPOWER FIGURES.

9. BELGIAN REP OBSERVED THAT THE WESTERN REPS THOUGHT THEY HAD MADE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT

PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE LAST SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD QUOTED WITH APPROVAL THE WEST'S RECENT SUGGESTION THAT PARTICIPANTS INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT. THE WEST NOW HAD MADE ONE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION, MAJOR ONE. THE ALLIES NOW HAD PROPOSED COMMITMENTS IN PHASE I BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO COVER BOTH GROUND MANPOWER AND AIR MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON THE OVERALL AIR MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES AND THE EARLIER ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER WITH WESTERN PHASE I REDUCTION PROPOSALS, CONSTITUTED A COMPREHENSIVE AND LOGICAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIAL AND EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS A FRAMEWORK WHICH WOULD PERMIT PARTICIPANTS TO ADDRESS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN THE AREA, THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES, AND TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS CRUCIAL PROBLEM WITH THE ASSURANCE THAT AIR FORCES WERE ADEQUATELY COVERED. BELGIAN REP CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD BE INTERESTED NOW IN HAVING THE EAST'S VIEWS ON THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR MANPOWER.

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FROM US REP MBFR

10. GDR REP OESER SAID ALLIED REPS HAD SPOKEN OF THEIR IDEAS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH AIR FORCE MANPOWER. IN THE LAST SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD DISCUSSED THEIR NEW PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON A FREEZE. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THE TWO HAD SOME INTER-CONNECTION. THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL DEALT WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT DEPART FROM DEALING WITH THE SUBJECT OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. EASTERN REPS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS WESTERN REMARKS IN DUE COURSE, BUT HE WISHED FIRST TO PRESENT SOME COMMENTS ON THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION. HE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT THAT ALLIED REPS HAD NOT YET MENTIONED THIS ISSUE IN THEIR STATEMENT. EASTERN REPS HAD SOME COMMENTS ON WESTERN REACTION DURING LAST SESSION TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. SINCE ALLIED REPS HAD MADE NO ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON THAT PROPOSAL. SINCE ALLIED REPS HAD MADE NO ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON THAT PROPOSAL IN PRESENT SESSION, HE HAD PERFORCE TO REFER TO WHAT THEY HAD SAID
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ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION.

11. GDR REP SAID ALLIED REACTION IN THE LAST SESSION TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WESTERN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL. EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE PROPOSAL DID NOT DEAL WITH REDUCTIONS. BUT THE PROPOSAL WAS IMPORTANT AS A STIMULUS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE STAGE IN WHICH THEY ACTUALLY NOW FOUND THEMSELVES AFTER A YEAR OF NEGOTIATION HAD BROUGHT NO PROGRESS ON THE SUBSTANCE. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS IMPORTANT. THERE WOULD BE A MUTUAL OBLIGATION OF THE PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THEIR MANPOWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS WOULD PLACE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF A FURTHER ARMS RACE, ESPECIALLY IN AN AREA WHERE THE CONFRONTATION OF ARMED FORCES AND GROUPINGS HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY ACUTE FOR SEVERAL YEARS. AGREEMENT ON THIS PROPOSAL WOULD PROMOTE CONTINUATION OF EFFORTS FOR AGREED SOLUTIONS TO THE ESSENTIAL AIM OF REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA. THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE WELCOMED IN ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND NOT ONLY IN EUROPE. IT WOULD BE WELCOMED EVERYWHERE

AS A REAL MEASURE OF DETENTE AND A REAL ENHANCEMENT OF EUROPEAN STABILITY AND SECURITY. THE REACTION OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION HAD BEEN HASTY AND WHOLLY NEGATIVE. BUT EASTERN REPS HAD NOTED THAT THE WESTERN REACTION HAD BEEN SIMILAR WHEN THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD PRESENTED THEIR INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL. NONETHELESS, ALLIED REPS HAD SAID AT THE LAST SESSION THAT THEY WERE STUDYING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FURTHER. EASTERN REPS HOPED ALLIED REPS WOULD GIVE A MORE CONSIDERED AND POSITIVE RESPONSE.

12. GDR REP SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR EAST TO UNDERSTAND WHY WESTERN REPS HAD RESPONDED IN SUCH A NEGATIVE WAY TO THIS PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. WHY DID THE WEST CONSIDER A NON-INCREASE DECLARATION CONTRARY TO WESTERN INTEREST IN A PERIOD WHEN WESTERN NEWSPAPERS OFTEN WROTE THAT SOCIALIST STATES WERE INCREASING THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA?

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13. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT WESTERN REACTION TO THE ORIGINAL EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER IN WHICH EAST HAD MADE PROPOSALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. ALLIED REPS HAD REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP IN 1975 ALTHOUGH THIS STEP HAD BEEN AIMED AT EARLY AGREEMENT AND TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN POSITION. NOW, ALLIED REPS WERE SHARPLY REJECTING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE DECLARATION ON MAN-POWER ON THE ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WAS NOT EVEN A REDUCTION PROPOSAL BUT MERELY AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE FORCES.

14. GDR REP SAID THAT, IN THIS CONTEXT, EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED WESTERN PROPOSAL TO EXCHANGE DATA EVEN MORE STRANGE. IF WEST WAS NOT READY TO AGREE ON REDUCTIONS AND NOT EVEN ON A NON-INCREASE AGREEMENT, WHAT WAS THE SENSE OF PROPOSING TO EXCHANGE DATA? THIS POSITION WAS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE WISHED TO REFER TO THE PLENARY STATEMENT OF 28 NOVEMBER PRESENTED BY THE LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WHOLE ESSENCE OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS LAY IN THE EFFORT TO SHAPE JOINTLY AGREED FORCE LEVELS. EASTERN REPS REGARDED THIS AS AN ATTEMPT ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN REPS TO REPLACE THE AGREED TOPIC OF NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED, NAMELY, TO NEGOTIATE ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WITH SOMETHING DIFFERENT ON

WHICH THEY HAD NOT AGREED.

15. GDR REP STATED THAT, CONTRARY TO THE DECISIONS REACHED IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS, WEST ONLY WANTED TO SPEAK ON REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES. WESTERN REPS WERE MORE AND MORE SEEKING TO EXCLUDE ANY REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS. THIS WAS THE PRESENT SITUATION. IF PARTICIPANTS ANALYZED THE SITUATION AND WHAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES SAID WEST WAS READY TO DO, THEY BELIEVED WEST SHOULD BE READY AT LEAST TO AGREE ON A FREEZE COMMITMENT. AFTER ALL, ALLIED REPS HAD THEMSELVES SPOKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND NOW OF A NON-INCREASE FOR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. FURTHERMORE,
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ON THE WESTERN SIDE PARTICIPANTS WERE SPEAKING ONLY OF REDUCTIONS OF PERSONNEL AND NOT OF ARMAMENTS. THEREFORE, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A DECLARATION ON NON-INCREASE OF PERSONNEL STRENGTH SHOULD MEET WESTERN INTERESTS. THIS PROPOSAL WAS A REALISTIC AND POSITIVE WAY TO STOP THE ARMS RACE IN THE AREA ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. WESTERN REPS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO LINK THEIR REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL WITH THEIR WHOLE PLAN AND SHOULD COMMENT ON IT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF ITS OBJECTIVE MERITS.

16. UK REP SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT AT THE LAST MEETING. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF HE COMMENTED ON WHAT GDR REP HAD JUST SAID. ONE POINT GDR REP HAD JUST MADE WAS TO SUGGEST THAT THE WEST OVER THE PAST YEAR HAD REACTED NEGATIVELY TO A NUMBER OF SERIOUS EASTERN PROPOSALS, THAT OF NOVEMBER 8TH, THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL, AND NOW, THE PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION

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ON NON-INCREASE OF MANPOWER. THIS WAS NOT A PROFITABLE WAY OF CHARACTERIZING THE MANNER IN WHICH WEST HAD PLAYED ITS PART IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. IT WAS QUITE TRUE THAT ALLIED REPS HAD CRITICIZED VARIOUS EASTERN PROPOSALS, HAD POINTED OUT THEIR OBJECTIONS TO THEM AND THEIR DEFECTS. ALLIED REPS DID NOT BELIEVE THESE PROPOSALS MATCHED THE OBJECTIVES PARTICIPANTS MUST MEET IF THEY WERE TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. UK REP SAID THAT FOR HIS PART, HE COULD SAY SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THE POINT WHICH GDR REP HAD JUST MADE, ONLY ABOUT EASTERN REACTIONS TO WESTERN PROPOSALS, REACTIONS WHICH ALLIED REPS FOUND NEGATIVE. ALLIED REPS HAD MADE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS AIMED AT FINDING AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLES. THEY HAD THEN LISTENED TO VARIOUS EASTERN COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS OF THESE PROPOSALS. IN RESPONSE, ALLIED REPS HAD MADE CONTINUAL EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE LAST YEAR TO FIND WAYS OF CLARIFYING, MODIFYING AND EXTENDING THEIR
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PROPOSALS TO MEET THE VARIOUS CRITICISMS AND CONCERNS THE EAST HAD RAISED ABOUT THEM. ALLIED REPS HAD DONE ALL THIS WITH THE POSITIVE AIM OF TRYING TO FIND A WAY OF SOLVING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES WHICH STOOD IN THE WAY OF PROGRESS. IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT ALLIED REPS HAD REFERRED TO THE LATEST PROPOSAL, THAT FOR A JOINT DECLARATION ON NON-INCREASE OF FORCES.

18. UK REP CONTINUED, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, THAT, AS ALLIED REPS HAD SAID IN

THEIR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, THE WESTERN REPS SAW SERIOUS DEFECTS IN THE EAST'S FREEZE PROPOSAL. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, IT WAS REALLY UNWORKABLE. HERE HE HAD TO DIFFER WITH GDR REP'S REMARKS ON DATA AND FIGURES. HOW COULD THE WEST ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT TO RESPECT PRESENT FORCE LEVELS WHEN THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT AS TO WHAT THOSE FORCE LEVELS WERE? SECOND, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ENVISAGED INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS BY EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO EXCEED THE PRESENT LEVEL OF THEIR OWN FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE PROPOSAL WAS THEREFORE TANTAMOUNT TO ESTABLISHING NATIONAL CEILINGS, TO WHICH THE WEST WAS OPPOSED. THIRD, IN THE ALLIES' VIEW, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SEEMED INTENDED TO PREJUDICE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS TOWARDS THE EAST'S VIEW THAT THE PRESENT UNEQUAL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES SHOULD BE PRESERVED THROUGH ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE. THE MAIN THEME OF LUXEMBOURG REP'S PLENARY STATEMENT CONCERNED THIS VERY POINT, THE NEED TO AGREE ON AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME AND THIS WAS WHY HE HAD REFERRED TO THE NEED TO SHAPE JOINTLY AGREED FORCE LEVELS.

19. UK REP SAID THAT THESE WERE THE REASONS WHY THE WEST CONTINUED SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE MERITS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION. BUT, AS THE ALLIED REPS HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DO LAST WEEK, THEY WERE CONTINUING TO STUDY THE ISSUES IT RAISED AND EXPECTED TO GIVE THE EAST FULLER COMMENTS SHORTLY. IN THE LAST SESSION, WESTERN REPS HAD TABLED A MORE PRODUCTIVE PROPOSAL, ONE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE REACHING AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS, WHICH WAS THE REAL BUSINESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

20. UK REP SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL THE WEST HAD
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MADE IN THE LAST SESSION FOR A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT MEANT THAT THE ALLIES HAD NOW PRESENTED A COMPREHENSIVE AND FULLY FLESHED OUT REDUCTION PROPOSAL. THIS PROPOSAL, WHILE DEALING WITH THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF THE DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, MET THE EAST'S EXPRESSED CONCERNS THAT THERE BE NO INCREASE EITHER IN AIR FORCES OR IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS PENDING A PHASE II AGREEMENT. COMBINING THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS IN THE WAY THE WEST HAD SUGGESTED WITH A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT APPEARED TO THE ALLIES THE MOST PRODUCTIVE APPROACH TO GETTING ON WITH THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AGREEING ON REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS HAD DEALT IN A PRACTICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER WITH THE EAST'S CONCERN THAT, IF ONLY THE US AND SOVIET UNION REDUCED IN THE FIRST PHASE, THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO INCREASE THEIR

FORCES. THE PROPOSAL ALSO DEALT IN A PRACTICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER WITH THE OTHER EASTERN CONCERN THAT, IF ONLY GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED, PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO INCREASE THEIR AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

21. UK REP CONCLUDED THAT THE WESTER SIDE CONSIDERED THAT ITS PROPOSAL TO COMBINE THESE TWO NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS WITH A PHASE I REDUCTION AGREEMENT PROVIDED A REASONABLE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH PARTICIPANTS COULD CONCENTRATE ON THE MAIN ISSUE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS-- THE ACHIEVEMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS, AS THE UK REP HAD SAID, THE REAL WORK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ALLIES WOULD LIKE TO MOVE FORWARD ON IT.

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FROM US REP MBFR

22. UK REP SAID ALLIED REPS WOULD APPRECIATE EASTERN REACTIONS ON THIS PROPOSAL WHICH ALLIED REPS HAD YET TO HEAR.

23. POLISH REP STRULAK SAID HE WOULD TRY TO ANSWER BOTH PARTS OF UK REP'S REMARKS. IN THE FIRST PART OF HIS REMARKS, UK REP HAD REFERRED TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE DECLARATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE WISHED TO REFER TO GDR REP'S COMMENT THAT THE WESTERN REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL HAD BEEN HASTILY NEGATIVE. PERHAPS THE PRESENT REPLY WAS NOT HASTY AFTER A WEEK OF CONSIDERATION, BUT IT STILL SHOWED CONTINUED STRESS ON A NEGATIVE APPROACH. THIS FOLLOWED A PATTERN BECAUSE WESTERN REPS HAD ADOPTED THE SAME SORT OF NEGATIVE APPROACH TO ALL EASTERN PROPOSALS.

24. POLISH REP SAID THAT, EVEN THOUGH EASTERN REPS HAD NOTED THE EXISTENCE OF THIS NEGATIVE APPROACH DURING THE
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LAST SESSION, THEY HAD CAREFULLY ANALYZED THE OBJECTIONS RAISED BY ALLIED REPS IN THAT SESSION. EASTERN REPS WISHED TO ASSUME THAT WHAT THE WEST WAS OBJECTING TO WAS ONLY THE METHODOLOGY INVOLVED IN THE EASTERN APPROACH, AND THAT WESTERN REPS DID NOT OPPOSE THE IDEA OF A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ITSELF. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS ASSUMED PARTICIPANTS COULD ENTER INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF A NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL. WHEN EASTERN REPS EXAMINED THE ESSENCE OF THE WESTERN CRITICISM, THEY IDENTIFIED IT AS THE CHARGE THAT THE NEWEST EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT FIND WESTERN APPROVAL BECAUSE IT WAS NOT DERIVED FROM THE WESTERN PROGRAM. ALONG WITH THIS BASIC CRITICISM, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAD BEEN GIVEN A PARTIAL INTERPRETATION AND MOTIVES HAD BEEN ASCRIBED TO THE EAST WHICH IT NEVER HAD. IN COMMENT ON THE LAST OCCASION AND IN UK REP'S COMMENTS DURING PRESENT SESSION, ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL DID NOT AIM AT ELIMINATING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND FOR THAT REASON WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. ALLIED REPS KNEW WHAT THE EASTERN REPS THOUGHT OF THE DISPARITY ARGUMENT. IT HAD BEEN INVENTED IN ORDER TO GAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE, CONTRADICTING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AGREED FOR THE TALKS AND IT COULD THEREFORE NOT BE ACCEPTED AS A PREMISE FOR NEGOTIATION.

25. US REP ASKED WHETHER POLISH REP MEANT THAT ALLIED REPS HAD INVENTED THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY OR HAD MERELY OVEREMPHASIZED IT. DID EAST DOUBT THAT DISPARITY EXISTED? POLISH REP SAID DISPARITY ARGUMENT HAD BEEN INVENTED THROUGH THE ALLIES TAKING ONE ELEMENT OF THE OVERALL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN ISOLATION AND IGNORING THE REMAINDER. US REP SAID THAT, APPARENTLY EASTERN REPS DID NOT DENY THE EXISTENCE OF A GROUND FORCE DISPARITY BUT WERE MERELY CLAIMING THAT THE WEST WAS ATTACHING TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO IT.

AFTER HESITATION, POLISH REP SAID IT WAS PROBABLY THE LATTER THAT HE MEANT. US REP SAID HE WAS ONLY TRYING TO FIND OUT THE FACTUAL SITUATION. DID EASTERN REPS MEAN THAT ALLIES HAD INVENTED THE FACT OF GROUND FORCE DISPARITY OR WERE OVEREMPHASIZING IT? HE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE FROM EASTERN REP'S RESPONSE THAT HE AGREED THE DISPARITY EXISTED, BUT FELT THAT WESTERN REPS WERE ATTACHING TOO MUCH

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IMPORTANCE TO IT.

26. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS WAS THE WRONG INTERPRETATION. EASTERN REPS NEITHER DENIED NOR CONFIRMED THE EXISTENCE OF THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. BUT WHAT ABOUT NUCLEAR FORCES? DID THE WEST HAVE MORE NUCLEAR FORCES THAN THE EAST? OESER SAID THIS WAS THE EASTERN DISPARITY ARGUMENT. THE WEST HAD MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MORE LAUNCHERS. EVERYTHING HAD TO BE INCLUDED IN THE PICTURE IN ORDER TO HAVE A FULL PICUTRE. COUNTING SOLDIERS ALONE WOULD NOT GIVE THE FULL PICTURE. POLISH REP SAID THERE WAS NO POINT IN THE WESTERN CRITICISM THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL INVOLVED THE ISISUE OF ESTABLISHING A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS. THESE WERE TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SUBJECTS. US REP ASKED WHETHER THIS STATEMENT MEANT THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE A FREEZE, EAST WOULD NOT POINT TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE FREEZE AS GROUNDS FOR REJECTING ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. POLISH REP SAID THAT SINCE THE EASTERN PROOSAL DID NOT AIM AT REDUCTIONS, IT DID NOT AIM TO REAFFIRM OR ENDORSE ANY MODE OF REDUCTIONS. IN ADDITION, EASTERN REPS HAD EXPLICITLY STATED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF PARTICIPANTS AS REAGARDS REDUCTIONS.

27. POLISH REP SAID THAT ALLIED REPS HAD SAID ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE WOULD FREEZE THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. THIS TOO WAS A MISREADING OF THE SITUATION. THE ISSUE WAS A COMMITMENT CLEARLY LIMITED IN TIME. THIS TEMPORARY COMMITMENT WOULD BE SUPPLANTED BY THE FIRST AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AS SOON AS THE LATTER WAS WORKED OUT. HE ASSUMED IT WAS THE DESIRE OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO REACH A REDUCTION AGREEMENT SOON. THIS WOULD THUS MAKE THE DURATION OF A FREEZE COMMITMENT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. POLISH REP SAID THAT, HOWEVER, IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN REPS WERE READY TO CONSIDER WHATEVER OTHER PREFERENCE OR PREFERRED SUGGESTIONS ON LIMITING THE DURATION OF SUCH A NO-INCREASE DECLARATION WESTERN REPS WERE PREPARED T MAKE. AS REGARDS TIMING OF REDUCTIONS IN GENERAL, EAST'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MUCH MORE RAPID AND SPECIFIC THAN ANYTHING SUGGESTED

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BY THE WEST.

28. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT WESTERN REPS HAD REFERRED TO THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS. TO THIS, HE WOULD SAY ON A METHODOLOGICAL BASIS, THAT, HERE AGAIN, EASTERN REPS SAW MANIFESTATIONS OF THE TENDENCY TO SAY NO TO ANYTHING THAT WAS NOT PART OF THE WESTERN POSITION. ON THE BASIS OF THIS LOGIC, PARTICIPANTS IN ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS COULD NOT AND WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO STOP THE ARMS RACE. OR WAS IT A QUESTION THAT THE WESTERN REPS WERE REALLY NOT WILLING TO TAKE THIS ACTION? THE EASTERN POSITION TOWARDS NATIONAL CEILINGS WAS CLEAR: EACH STATE COMMITTING ITSELF TO NON-INCREASE OBLIGATIONS SHOULD RESPECT THIS OBLIGATION AND NOT SEEK TO INFRINGE ON IT, HAVING IN MIND THAT ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN SHOULD BE MUTUAL.

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P 060800Z DEC 74

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 726

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

29. POLISH REP SAID THAT A FURTHER WESTERN OBJECTION TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN THE ISSUE OF VERIFYING IMPLEMENTATION BY EACH PARTICIPATING STATE OF ITS COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE ITS FORCES. HOWEVER, WHEN EASTERN REPS EXAMINED EARLIER STATEMENTS BY WESTERN REPS, THESE THREW DOUBT ON THE LOGIC OF THIS POINT. WESTERN REPS WERE CLAIMING THAT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT KNOW THE LEVEL OF FORCES IN THE AREA OR HOW THEY COULD VERIFY THEM. IF THIS POINT COULD NOT BE VERIFIED, HOW THEN HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR WESTERN REPS TO STATE IN A RECENT SESSION THAT DATA FROM THEIR LATEST REVIEW OF FORCES IN THE AREA HAD INDICATED RECENT SMALL INCREASES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES BY APPROXIMATELY THE SAME NUMBER? THIS WAS THE EASTERN ANSWER TO THE WESTERN SUGGESTION THAT A FREEZE WAS UNWORKABLE AND IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY.

30. POLISH REP STATED THAT WESTERN CRITICISMS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL COULD LEAD TO ONLY
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ONE CONCLUSION. WESTERN REPS CLAIMED THAT A FREEZE WOULD MAKE DIFFICULT AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS WERE GOING SO FAR AS TO IMPLY THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND IT IF THEY AGREED TO A FREEZE DESIGNED TO STOP THE ARMS RACE BECAUSE IT WAS CONSIDERED BETTER TO CONTINUE THAT ARMS RACE. EASTERN REPS WANTED WESTERN REPS TO STOP LOOKING AT EASTERN PROPOSALS THROUGH DARK GLASSES. IF WESTERN REPS DID SO, THEY WOULD REALIZE THE SINCERITY OF THE EASTERN DESIRE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF AGREED PRINCIPLES. AS FAR AS EASTERN REPS COULD MAKE OUT, WESTERN REPS WERE STILL UNWILLING TO DO SO. EASTERN REPS WERE PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE WEST STILL HAD THE EASTERN PROPOSAL UNDER STUDY AND WOULD MAKE FULLER REMARKS AT A LATER TIME. THEY HOPED THESE REMARKS WOULD BE OF A MORE POSITIVE CONCLUSION.

31. POLISH REP SAID HE WOULD NOW LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE WESTERN SUGGESTION TO "COVER" AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. FIRST, EASTERN REPS NOTED WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE STILL REFUSING TO AGREE ON A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES AS EAST HAD PROPOSED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SECOND, EAST NOTED THAT THE PROPOSED NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE ON THE OVERALL AIR FORCE

MANPOWER OF THE TWO GROUPINGS, NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. THIS WAS A NEGATIVE FEATURE. THIRD, A POINT EAST DID NOT LIKE ABOUT THE PROPOSAL WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN MADE DEPENDENT ON EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS WHICH THE EAST CONSIDERED UNACCEPTABLE. UK REP HAD UNDERLINED THIS POINT IN HIS REMARKS WHEN HE HAD SAID THAT THE MAIN ISSUE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS NOT THE AGREED MAIN ISSUE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. UK REP HAD STRESSED THAT THIS NEW COMMITMENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY ON CONDITION OF CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, ONE SATISFACTORY TO THE WEST. WESTERN REPS KNEW EASTERN VIEWS ON THE WESTERN FIRST PHASE PROPOSAL AND WHY THE EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT IT. APART FROM
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THESE REMARKS, EASTERN REPS WERE READY TO LISTEN TO POSSIBLE WESTERN FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS OF THEIR PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A FULLER UNDERSTANDING OF THE WESTERN SUGGESTION.

32. POLISH REP SAID THAT, IN CONCLUSION, HE WISHED TO COMMENT THAT THE IDEA OF A NON-INCREASE IN ARMED FORCES SEEMED TO BE MAKING HEADWAY ON THE WESTERN SIDE AS WAS REFLECTED IN THE MOST RECENT WESTERN SUGGESTION. THIS WAS ONE REASON MORE WHY THE WEST SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL.

33. US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON POLISH REP'S LAST REMARKS. AS ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION, WEST HAD PROPOSED TO LIMIT BOTH GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER, THAT WAS TO SAY, ALL MILITARY MANPOWER EXCEPT THE NAVY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. BUT THESE PROPOSALS WERE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE REDUCTION GOAL AND ON HAVING SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD MOVE TOWARDS THAT GOAL. WESTERN REPS SAW NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS AS A COMPLEMENT TO A REDUCTION PROGRAM AND NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR IT. AT THE OPENING OF THE POLISH REP'S REMARKS, LATTER HAD REFERRED TO WESTERN REPS REMARKS AS ASCRIBING ULTERIOR MOTIVES TO THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL. AS ALLIED REPS HAD SAID ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THEY NATURALLY HAD TO EXAMINE THE ACTUAL EFFECT OF PROPOSALS IF THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED AND IT WAS THAT EFFECT TO WHICH UK REP HAD REFERRED. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SEEMED INTENDED TO PREJUDICE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION ON REDUCTIONS TOWARDS THE EASTERN VIEW THAT THE PRESENT EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP

OF FORCES SHOULD BE PRESERVED THROUGH ANY AGREEMENT REACHED
HERE.

34. US REP SAID THAT, AS TO EASTERN MOTIVES, WESTERN
REPS MUST ASSUME THAT EASTERN REPS INTENDED THE NATURAL
EFFECT OF THE PROPOSAL THAT THEY WERE MAKING. IN
CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE
PROPOSAL, HE WISHED TO ASK ONE QUESTION. EASTERN REPS HAD
SAID IN THE LAST SESSION THAT THE PROPOSED COMMITMENT
RELATED SOLELY TO MANPOWER ALONE. HOWEVER, THE TEXT OF
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THE PROPOSAL PRESENTED BY THE EAST ALSO CONTAINED A
STATEMENT THAT THE PARTIES DESIRED "TO REFRAIN FROM
ACTIONS WHICH MAY HAMPER THIS." DID THIS PHRASE ALSO
ONLY REFER TO MANPOWER? OR DID IT HAVE A BROADER
SCOPE? IN OTHER WORDS, DID THE EASTERN PROPOSAL HAVE THE
SOLE PURPOSE OF LIMITING MANPOWER OR WAS IT INTENDED TO
AFFECT ACTIONS OTHER THAN INCREASES IN MANPOWER?

35. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD ANSWER THIS QUESTION AT A
LATER TIME.

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W
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P 060800Z DEC 74

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0727

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO: RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO PRIORITY 0570

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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36. US REP SAID THE UK REP HAD JUST GIVEN THE EAST WESTERN VIEWS ON THE EASTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLIED REPS WERE CONTINUING TO STUDY THE ISSUES IT RAISED AND WOULD RESPOND ON IT MORE FULLY SHORTLY. US REP CONTINUED, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, THAT THE WEST, FOR ITS PART, HAD PROPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT A MUTUAL NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND A MUTUAL NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON OVERALL AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS HAD URGED BEFORE AND NOW WERE URGING THE EAST AGAIN TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THESE PROPOSALS. THE ALLIED REPS HAD EXPLAINED WHY THEY CONSIDERED THAT THEIR OWN PROPOSALS REPRESENTED A MORE PRODUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE TASK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IN THAT THEY DIRECTLY FACILITATED REACHING AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. THEY MET DIRECTLY THE CONCERNS EASTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED THAT, IF ONLY US AND SOVIET GROUND
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FORCES WERE REDUCED IN PHASE I, OTHER FORCES COULD BE INCREASED. THEY MEET THE EAST'S CONCERN, EXPRESSED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO COVERAGE OF GROUND FORCES ALONE. NOW THE WEST HAD SHOWN THE EAST HOW THESE CONCERNS COULD BE DEALT WITH PRODUCTIVELY. THE ALLIES WERE READY TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COVER, IN SOME MANNER, ALL ARMED FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, EXCEPT FOR THE NAVY.

37. US REP SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON ACHIEVING SUCH AGREEMENT. ALL ISSUES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THAT CONTEXT. THE WESTERN CONCEPT FOR NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS DID PRECISELY THAT. THEREFORE, THE ALLIES CONSIDERED THAT THE NON-INCREASE PROPOSALS THEY HAD MADE SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR PARTICIPANTS TO REACH A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE WESTERN REPS INVITED THE EAST'S VIEWS ON THE PROPOSAL THE ALLIES HAD MADE. THE WESTERN SIDE

BELIEVED IT HAD PROPOSED A WORKABLE WAY OF DEALING WITH AIR FORCES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD NOW AGREE TO TURN THEIR ATTENTION TO THE MAIN PROBLEM IN THE AREA, THE ISSUE OF GROUND FORCES.

38. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK A FEW QUESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER. ALLIED REPS HAD CLARIFIED SOME POINTS THE EAST HAD IN MIND. OTHER POINTS REMAINED UNCLEAR. AS POLISH REP HAD SAID EASTERN REPS LOOKED DORWARD TO FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND WOULD WELCOME THEM. HOWEVER, BASED ON EXPLANATIONS THUS FAR GIVEN EAST, HE WISHED TO ASK WHETHER WHAT WEST HAD PROPOSED WAS AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THE TOTALS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN BOTH PHASES. HE ASKED THIS QUESTION SO THAT HE COULD BETTER UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, WHAT THE WESTERN REPS APPARENTLY HAD IN MIND WAS THAT THEY WOULD ESTABLISH AN OVERALL CEILING FOR THE AIR FORCE MANPOWER
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OF THE TWO ALLIANCES MIGHT BE APPLIED IN BOTH PHASES.

39. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS WERE PROPOSING THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER BE COVERED ON BOTH SIDES BY APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO PREVENT INCREASE BY EITHER WEST OR EAST OF THE OVERALL LEVEL OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON EITHER SIDE.

40. KHESTOV SAID THAT, EARLIER, ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THAT REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON GROUND FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES. US REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO EXCEED THE OVERALL LEVEL OF WESTERN FORCES REMAINING AFTER FIRST PHASE US REDUCTIONS. KHESTOV SAID HIS QUESTION WAS REALLY THAT THE WEST HAD HAD IN MIND AN OVERALL CEILING OF GROUND FORCES AND APPARENTLY THE SAME IDEA IN MIND AS FAR AS AIR FORCE MANPOWER WAS CONCERNED. WOULD THESE CEILINGS BE DIFFERENT, OR WOULD THE SAME CEILING COVER BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES? US REP SAID THE WESTERN SUGGESTION WAS DESIGNED TO MEET THE REPEATED CONCERN OF THE EAST UNDER THE ORIGINAL WESTERN APPROACH THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN ANY WAY. ALLIED REPS WERE NOT NOW ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF THE FORM OF A POSSIBLE LIMITATION ON AIR MANPOWER. THIS WAS A QUESTION OF DETAIL WHICH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT A LATER TIME WHEN THE SPECIFICS OF ALL SUGGESTED COMMITMENTS WOULD BE DISCUSSED. THIS WAS ALL ALLIED REPS HAD TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT AT THIS TIME.

41. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AT AN EARLIER POINT

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W
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P 060800Z DEC 74

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 728

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

ALLIED REPS HAD SAID AIR FORCE MANPOWER WOULD BE
"COVERED" IN A SECOND PHASE. APPARENTLY THEY HAD
IN MIND SOME OBLIGATION ON MANPOWER SHORT OF
REDUCTIONS, LIKE A FREEZE OR A NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL.
WHICH WOULD IT BE? US REP SAID THAT CONTINUING SOME
LIMITATION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER INTO A SECOND PHASE
COULD BE DONE IN VARIOUS WAYS. A NON-INCREASE
COMMITMENT, AS SUGGESTED BY KHLESTOV, WAS ONE
POSSIBILITY WHICH THE WEST COULD CONSIDER. KHLESTOV
ASKED WHICH POSSIBILITY DID THE WESTERN REPS THEMSELVES HAVE
IN MIND. US REP SAID HE COULD GIVE NO DEFINITIVE
REPLY TO THIS QUESTION, WHICH WAS STILL UNDER STUDY
BUT, IN ANY CASE, MEASURES SHOULD BE AGREED WHICH PROVIDED
EFFECTIVE WAYS TO PREVENT INCREASE OF AIR FORCE
MANPOWER IN THE AREA. UK REP SAID THE ONLY POINT

HE WISHED TO ADD WAS THAT OF COURSE WESTERN
REPS RECOGNIZE THAT A LIMITATION ON AIR FORCES
MANPOWER ONCE AGREED WOULD NEED TO BE CONTINUED INTO
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PHASE II IN SOME FORM. BUT THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE
NEGOTIATED IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. ONE POSSIBLE WAY
OF DEALING WITH IT WULD BE TO CONTINUE A NON-INCREASE
COMMITMENT.

42. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO ASK A FURTHER QUESTION.
US AND UK REPS HAD JUST EMPHASIZED THAT BY COVERING
AIR FORCE PERSONNEL THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD COVER
ALL UNIFORMED PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY EXCEPT THE
NAVY. DID THIS POINT IMPLY THAT THE WESTERN
PROPOSAL ALSO COVERED THE UNIFORMED PERSONNEL OF
NUCLEAR UNITS? US REP SAID THIS WAS THE CASE. ALL
SUCH PERSONNEL WERE INCLUDED EITHER IN THE
AIR FORCE OR ARMY. KHLESTOV SAID THEN THE WEST
HAD NO SEPARATE SPECIAL UNITS FOR THIS PURPOSE.
UK REP SIAD THE ANSWER WAS "NO. HE ALREADY MADE
THIS POINT IN AN EARLIER SESSION IN OCTOBER.

43. POLISH REP SIAD HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION
WHICH LAY SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWO SUGGESTIONS UNDER
DISCUSSION IN THE PRESENT SESSION. WESTERN REPS HAD
SAID THAT A FIRST NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD COME
INTO FORCE AFTER OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, WAS THER A POSSIBILITY THAT THE
WEST HAD IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FIRST PHASE FREEZE GOING
INTO EFFECT BEFORE A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED? US REP
SAID NO. BOTH THE FREEZE AND THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT
WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE TOGETHER.

44. POLISH REP SAID THAT, IN THAT CASE, HE WISHED TO
ASK WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR EITHER SIDE TO
INCREASE ITS FORCES BEFORE AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED?
US REP SAID THAT NO COMMITMENT HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN
IN THIS RESPECT. POLISH REP SAID HE AGREED THIS WAS
THE FORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS, BUT HE WANTED TO KNOW
WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE THIS.
US REP SAID THAT PROBABLY WHAT THE POLISH REP HAD
IN MIND WAS THE RESTRUCTURING IN WHICH US FORCES
IN THE AREA WERE CURRENTLY ENGAGED. THIS RESTRUCTURING
WOULD NOT INCREASE THE NUMBER OF US SOLDIERS OR
AIRMEN IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. POLISH REP SAID
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HE DID NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC SITUATION IN MIND. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE ALLIED FRAME OF MIND WAS ON THIS POINT. UK REP SAID PARTICIPANTS WERE IN VIENNA TO NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS HAD MADE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS THE AGREED SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE NON-INCREASE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE ALLIED REPS WERE LINKED DIRECTLY WITH REDUCTION PROPOSALS.

45. GDR REP SAID THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE, BUT WOULD IT NOT BE USEFUL FOR PARTICIPANTS TO AGREE THEY WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH WAS THE OPPOSITE OF REDUCTIONS, THAT IS, THAT THEY WOULD NOT INCREASE THEIR FORCES. SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD BE CLEARLY AND DIRECTLY LINKED WITH THE TOPIC OF REDUCTIONS. TO AGREE NOT TO INCREASE ONES FORCES AND MEANWHILE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS, WAS THIS NOT A NORMAL APPROACH TO CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS?

46. BELGIAN REP SAID THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THEY WERE IN VIENNA TO NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTIONS. BUT THEY HAD NOT YET REACHED A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT SHOULD BE THE GOAL OF REDUCTIONS. GDR REP HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE AN AGREEMENT THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD DO NOTHING CONTRARY TO REDUCTIONS. WESTERN REPS COULD NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION UNLESS IT WAS CLEAR THAT TO DO SO WOULD BRING PARTICIPANTS CLOSER TO AN AGREED REDUCTION GOAL. IF A FREEZE SHOULD CODIFY THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP, THEN THE ANSWER WAS NO. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DO NOTHING TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN THEIR COMMENTS ON THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

47. KHLESTOV REQUESTED A BREAK FOR CONSULTATION AMONG PACT MEMBERS. ON RETURN, HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN HIS COMMENTS WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT THE MERE FACT THAT THE EAST WAS ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSALS WAS A WAY OF GETTING INFORMATION ABOUT NEW PROPOSALS AND MEANT NOTHING FURTHER. EASTERN REPS JUDGED FROM WESTERN REPLIES THAT THEY HAD NO CLEAR IDEAS ABOUT SOME SPECIFICS OF THEIR

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PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, SOME OF THE WESTERN REPLIES HAD ENABLED THE EAST TO GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE WEST HAD IN MIND. POLISH REP HAD GIVEN WESTERN REPS SOME PRELIMINARY EASTERN IDEAS ON WESTERN PROPOSALS.

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0729

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

48. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT WHEN PARTICIPANTS CONSIDERED ANY PROPOSAL THEY SHOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DOCUMENTS AGREED ON AT THAT TIME. HE HAD A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT DURING THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA EXCEPT THE NAVY WOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS. FOR THIS REASON AND OWING TO OTHER MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, THE EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT ALL MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS. IT WAS THE EASTERN VIEW THAT THE AIR FORCES TOO SHOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS.

49. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, WHEN WESTERN REPS TOLD EAST THAT THEY HAD MET EASTERN CONCERNS THAT IF ONLY GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED, PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE READY TO INCREASE THEIR AIR FORCES, THIS WAS A DISTORTION. IN CITING THIS PROBLEM, EASTERN REPS HAD ONLY WANTED

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TO POINT TO THE LACK OF LOGIC IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN REDUCING GROUND FORCES ONLY. IT WAS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THAT ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, EXCLUDING NAVY, SHOULD BE REDUCED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. OF COURSE, EAST WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER THE EXPLANATIONS ALLIED REPS MADE AT THIS OCCASION AND IT WOULD GIVE WESTERN REPS A FULLER REPLY AT ANOTHER TIME. BUT HE WISHED AT THIS TIME TO GIVE ALLIED REPS THE EASTERN ANALYSIS OF THEIR APPROACH IN ORDER TO HAVE BETTER UNDERSTANDING.

FOR THE LONG RUN, WESTERN REPS WERE ALLOWING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING A FREEZE ON MANPOWER IN THE AREA WITH EXCEPTION OF THE NAVY. THE WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THE NON-INCREASE IDEA SHOULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR REDUCTIONS, BUT AN ELEMENT OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS, WHEREAS THE EAST BELIEVED THAT A FREEZE SHOULD NOT REPLACE REDUCTIONS, BUT SHOULD COMPLEMENT THEM.

50. KHESTOV SAID THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT, IN REACTING TO LATEST EASTERN PROPOSAL, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THE ORIGINAL EASTERN PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 1973 AND THE INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL WERE NO LONGER VALID AND ON THE TABLE. TO THE CONTRARY, THESE PROPOSALS WERE STILL VALID. EASTERN REPS HOPED PARTICIPANTS WOULD CONSIDER THEM DURING THE RECESS, ESPECIALLY THE FIRST STEP, AND WOULD ADVANCE A MORE POSITIVE REACTION THEREAFTER, AND PERHAPS EVEN MAKE SOME COUNTER PROPOSALS ALONG THESE LINES PROPOSED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS COULD PROVE TO BE AN ADDITION STEP TOWARDS NEGOTIATION. THE POLISH REP HAD ALREADY ADVANCED ARGUMENTS WHY EAST DISAGREED WITH WESTERN CRITICISM OF THIS PROPOSAL. FOR EXAMPLE, EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE THE WEST-EAST FORCE RELATIONSHIP AND THUS SERVE AS A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS. HE WAS HIMSELF A LAWYER BUT HE BELIEVED WESTERN REPS HAD OVER-EMPHASIZE THIS LEGAL ASPECT. AS REGARDS THE FORM OF THE PROPOSALS, THE EAST HAD PROPOSED ONE FORM. THERE MIGHT BE VARIANTS ON SUCH A FORM. THE MAIN THING WAS THE POLITICAL ESSENCE AND THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE PARTICIPANTS. TO SPEAK IN PRACTICAL TERMS, EASTERN

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REPS HAD HEARD WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SAYING THAT THEY DID NOT

WISH TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES. SO THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THERE WERE ANY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WHO WOULD WISH TO INCREASE THEIR MANPOWER DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

51. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO US REP'S EARLIER QUESTION. EASTERN REPS ASSUMED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE SUPPOSED TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD REFERRED TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON TREATIES WHICH REFLECTED THIS GENERAL CONCEPT THAT PARTICIPANTS IN NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DAMAGE PROSPECTS IN NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT. WHAT THE EAST HAD PROPOSED WAS AGREEMENT TO A MORE SPECIFIC OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE MANPOWER. BUT IT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON A FUTURE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT AND WHEN SUCH AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO FORCE, IT WOULD BECOME NULL AND VOID. THEREFORE, THE NON-INCREASE OBLIGATION WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY SET A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS. IT WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. EASTERN REPS HAD ASSUMED IT WOULD BE EASIER TO AGREE ON NON-INCREASE OF MANPOWER. THEY HAD FORMULATED THE PRESENT DRAFT SO THAT ALL OF ITS PROVISIONS WERE BASED ON IDEA THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INCREASE IN MANPOWER. THEREFORE, THE PRESENT TEXT WAS POINTED TO THE IDEA OF A NON-INCREASE. UK REP SAID THAT IF THIS OBLIGATION WAS AUTOMATIC UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION, WHY WAS THE EAST SUGGESTING A NEW AND ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION? KHLESTOV SAID THE VIENNA TREATY CONTAINED AN UNDERTAKING OF A GENERAL FORM THAT PARTICIPANTS IN NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DAMAGE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THIS LANGUAGE FOR THE PRESENT CASE. THE SECOND REASON WAS THAT THE VIENNA CONVENTION WAS NOT YET IN FORCE, EVEN THOUGH IT DID REFLECT GENERAL PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

52. US REP ASKED WHETHER HE HAD UNDERSTOOD KHLESTOV CORRECTLY TO SAY THAT THE LANGUAGE US REP HAD ASKED ABOUT IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT REFERRED SOLELY TO MANPOWER. KHLESTOV SAID YES. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS ANSWER SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE

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A BLANK CHECK TO INCREASE THEIR ARMAMENTS. US REP SAID THAT HE ONLY WANTED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THIS SENTENCE DID OR DID NOT ADD TO THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT EASTERN REPS HAD ANSWERED THIS. THEY HAD ALSO ANSWERED THE UK QUESTION AS TO WHY A COMMITMENT WAS NEEDED. MANY COUNTRIES HAD THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO SUPPORT THE 1966 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON

NON-PROLIFERATION. UK REP SAID THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF UN RESOLUTION WAS DIFFERENT. IN THAT CASE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE SUCH THAT IF THIS COMMITMENT HAD NOT BEEN UNDERTAKEN, THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREJUDICED. THAT SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESENT ONE.

53. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT SESSION ON DECEMBER 10. THE EAST WILL BE HOST.RESOR

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